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AUTHOR Raven, Bertram H.
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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the concept of social power as defined by the author and John R.P. French fifteen years ago. Social power is the potential influence which an agent could exert over some person. The means for exercising that power could be in the form of any of six bases falling into the following categories: informational power, which is socially independent; coercion and reward, which are socially dependent on surveillance; and expert power, referent power, and legitimate power, which are socially dependent without surveillance. Various studies, such as a survey of the power husbands and wives use with respect to one another and a survey of the power students perceive as being exercised by their teachers and fellow students, are described to indicate the usefulness of the power base concept. Recent directions and ideas for further research using the concept of social power are mentioned and include assigning attribution of causality for change and social power and relating the cause of change with the choice of base for its accomplishment. (JH)

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Power Relations in Home and School

Bertram H. Raven

It has now been fifteen years since John R. P. French and I first published our theoretical paper, The Bases of Social Power. The analysis of social power relationships had proven useful--to French and to me at least. We thought that it helped us to organize meaningfully a number of research studies which had been conducted previously on the social influence processes, to suggest areas in which the problem area could be better defined, and to point out some directions for new research. A few studies were carried out initially within that framework, principally by French and myself and by several people who came into contact with us at the Institute for Social Research. Now we are pleased to see a number of additional studies conducted within that framework in the past several years. It has been gratifying to see the social power analysis applied to social power in industrial settings (Kahn, Wolfe, et al., 1964), the operations of sales firms (Bachman, Smith, & Slesinger, 1966), the counselor-client relationship (Strong, 1970), nurse-patient relationship (Rosenberg & Pearlin, 1962), relationships of parent to disturbed adolescents (Goldstein, Judd, et al., 1968), and relationships between minority group and majority group (Blalock, 1967).

Our approach defined power in terms of social influence. Social influence was defined as a change in a person's cognitions, attitudes, or behaviors (we could also have added emotions), which has its origin in another person or group--the influencing agent. Social power was then simply defined as the potential influence which the agent (O) could exert over some person (P). We

also proposed that most, if not all, social influence could be seen as stemming from one or more of six social power bases, as listed on the left column in Figure 1. O could influence P through threat of punishment (coercion), promise of reward, through P's identification with O (referent), through legitimacy--P's feeling that O has a right to attempt influence and P is obligated to comply, through O's superior knowledge (expertise), or through information--the persuasiveness of the content of communication which O transmits to P.

These six bases of power could be categorized further in terms of the extent to which the influenced change in P is dependent upon the agent O, and the extent to which surveillance by O is important in order for change to occur. More recently we have had to differentiate further within the differing bases of power. For those in the audience who are not familiar with this taxonomy as presented in Table 1, let us review it briefly:

Socially Independent Influence Table 1 about here

Informational Power. An agent, O, can sometimes influence P through changing P's perceptions or cognitions directly. For example, a parent can explain to a child precisely why the child should cross the street only at crosswalks. The parent can point out how rapidly the automobiles speed down the street, that they may not notice a small child darting between the cars, etc. They can refer to some other child who was severely injured by crossing in the middle of the block, etc. If the parent is effective with this communication, the child's cognitions are changed--his new patterns of behavior no longer depend on the parent, and certainly do not require that the parent observe the change. The change is thus socially independent, though it is dependent on other cognitions or values which the child has (about cars, children, and injury), and upon certain obvious values (like being uninjured and healthy).

Sometimes the information is communicated directly by O, as in this case. In other cases, it may be indirect or subtle. Recall the studies of "overheard" conversations (e.g., Walster & Festinger, 1962).

Socially Dependent on Surveillance

Coercion and Reward. At the other extreme, we have coercive power and reward power, both of which involve high dependence upon the influencing agent, and in which observability is very important. The parent might have threatened to spank the child if he crossed the street at some point other than the crosswalk, or the parent might promise to take the child to a movie if he did not cross in the middle of the block. In either case, the child, if he is influenced, will be very much aware of the fact that the parent is the source of the change. Furthermore, observability would be important--how can the parent punish the child for doing a bad thing, if the parent did not observe it. In our later formulations, we had to make a further distinction between personal and impersonal reward and coercion. The spanking is a very direct punishment, the movie is clear reward. However, love, affection, and approval can also be rewarding; dislike, rejection, disapproval can be very punishing. Here the reward and punishment is personal--there is an additional factor involved. The child must want to be loved by the parent. Where the parent is rejected by the child, personal reward and coercion will have little impact.

Socially Dependent without Surveillance

For the three remaining bases of power, surveillance by the influencing agent is not important in order for influence to occur. However, P, the influencee, still must relate his changed pattern of behavior or cognition to the influencing agent, O.

Expert power stems from the attribution of superior knowledge or ability to the influencing agent. The parent might then say, "Johnny, you must cross the street only at the crosswalk. Why? Well, just take my word for it--I am older than you and have been crossing streets for quite a long time. I happen to know what is best in this case." Now, let us bear in mind that with informational power, as in expert power, the influencing agent probably knows more than the influencee. The difference is that in informational influence, O imparts that information directly and having done so, O now leaves it to the information itself to continue to affect P. With expert power, P must continue to relate his change to O--"it is because my mother told me to do this, and she knows what is best."

Referent power depends on P's identification with O--either a feeling of one-ness or similarity, or a desire for such unity with O. "Cross the street here, Johnny, the way I do it. See?" In our review of instances of referent influence, a further differentiation seemed called for. There is the referent power which stems from perceived similarity and from group belongingness (e.g., teenager who identifies with other teenagers; the Jew who identifies with other Jews) and that which stems from a desire for one-ness--an upward looking form of referent influence, we might say. The high school student who reads the biography of Albert Einstein and decides that this is his ideal--even if he may never expect to reach it. The operations of referent influence will likely differ somewhat for these two forms.

Legitimate power stems from the influencee's acceptance of a role-structural relationship with the influencing agent, a relationship which gives the agent the right (and perhaps even the duty) to prescribe behavior or to

influence P, and obliges P to comply--"I do as he says because he has a legitimate right to ask me to do this, and I am obliged to comply," Legitimate power between officers and men was most clearly stated by Kipling--"Ours is not to reason why . . ." In our continuing example: "Cross at crosswalks because I told you to do that. After all, I am your father, and children are supposed to do what their father asks."

Though our original statement presented legitimate power in terms of some formal structural relationship--the legitimate power of supervisor over subordinate, parent over child, teacher over student, officer over enlisted man--we have since had to consider less formal social relationships which also obligate one person to accede to the requests of another. There is, of course, the more-or-less formal legitimate power of experimenter over the research subject, as illustrated dramatically in the studies by Orne and Evans (1965) and Milgram (1964, 1965). Less formal is the relationship of obligation resulting from favors. When O has done a favor for P, he can reasonably expect P to accede to a request in return (Regan, 1971), Even less obvious is what Berkowitz and his co-workers have referred to as the "power of dependence" (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963; Berkowitz, Klanderma., & Harris, 1964; Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966). The blind person may legitimately request the sighted to assist him in cross the street. The helpless-looking female, her automobile immobilized by a flat tire, may legitimately request assistance from a supposedly more capable male motorist. Ordinarily, this helplessness, and even obsequience, is emphasized by the dependent person. However, society may sometimes legitimize the power of the powerless, such as in the instance of the Jewish beggar in the shtetl, described by Zborowski and Herzog (1952) who stands at the door erect and domineering, demanding his rights as a beggar.

The richness of technique which can be used to involve the less formal forms of legitimacy may be illustrated in the following imaginary (but hardly impossible) telephone call from a mother to her son:

Mother (on telephone to son): "Hello, Sam? I just wanted to tell you that that coat that you left here had three buttons missing. Yes, I have sewed them all on now, and ironed it, took out the shine. It's good as new. You can pick it up when you come tonight for dinner. What? You may have work to do? Oh. Well, don't worry if you can't make it. Even if I made a big dinner, what does it matter. I didn't have anything else to do anyway. And most of it won't get wasted. It will keep. I can have it for lunch tomorrow, and dinner, and maybe I can give some away to the neighbors. . . No. It doesn't matter at all, don't you worry about that one bit. You must have other things to think about--it will all work out--like last week, right? . . . So do go ahead and enjoy yourself. Better it should happen to me and not to you . . . . But, of course, if you really think that you would like to come, and it isn't too much trouble . . . "

Perhaps you have recognized some elements of Dan Greenburg's whimsical How to be a Jewish Mother (1964). The influence techniques are not unique to Jewish mothers, indeed they are not unique to mothers, but they can be extremely effective. The relationship to the bases of social power is not entirely obvious. We do see elements of the legitimate power of the powerless, and particularly appeal to legitimate power of the powerless, and particularly appeal to legitimate obligations of a son to a mother. However, the techniques emphasize particularly a preparation for influence, a setting of the stage. You invoke obligations, by first helping or doing a good turn. You excite guilt feelings, making the person less capable of resisting the influence attempt that follows. (We would particularly recommend a close examination of

Greenburg's Figure IV, p. 33, in which he shows how you can offer a person an ash tray with your right hand, and then sweep it away just in time, so that you can catch the flicked ashes in your left hand.)

The effectiveness of arousal of guilt on setting the stage for influence has been demonstrated in several experimental studies (Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1966; Regan, 1968). The experimenter typically tricks the subject into committing some sort of transgression--e.g., having a confederate tell a subject about the experiment and getting the subject to lie and deny that he knows anything about it; having the subject apparently break an expensive piece of equipment; leaving notes around which the subject happens to notice, then saying that it is good that he has not seen those notes since they would ruin the experiment, etc. Regardless of the form of transgression, it appears that the guilt which the subject experiences is such that he is very ready to comply to requests (e.g., making telephone calls to save the California redwoods, or volunteering for extra experimental hours)--subjects who were not made to feel guilt complied much less. Now that we have illustrated some of the differing bases of power and their implications, let us examine two studies in which we have surveyed husbands and wives regarding the power which they use with respect to one another and students regarding the power which they see their teachers and fellow students as exercising.

The Bases of Conjugal Power

Richard Centers, Aroldo Rodrigues, and I have carried out a field survey in which we examined the relative power and bases of power of husbands and wives. The data were gathered from interviews with a representative sample of 776 husbands and wives in the Los Angeles area. One part of the study (Centers,

Raven & Rodrigues, 1971) concentrated particularly on relative power, replicating and extending earlier research by Blood and Wolfe (1960). The part of the study which I will describe here examines the bases of power (Raven, Centers & Rodrigues, TR25, 1969).

The respondent was told, "There are many cases where your wife/husband asks you to do something and you do it, even though you may not see clearly why it should be done . . . I will give you some possible reasons and would then like you to tell me how likely each of these reasons is . . ." The five reasons, presented on a card, represented the five bases of social power listed in the French and Raven (1959) paper. (1) Because if you did so, then she/he would do or say something nice for you in return (Reward); (2) Because if you did not do so, then she/he might do or say something which would be unpleasant for you (Coercion); (3) Because she/he knew what was best in this case and so you did what she/he asked you to do (Expert); (4) Because you felt that she/he had a right to ask you to do this and you felt obligated to do as she/he asked (Legitimacy); (5) Because you felt that you both are part of the same family and should see eye-to-eye on these matters (Referent).

The bases of power were rated independently on a scale of likeliness and then each respondent indicated which was most likely of the five. The findings in general indicate that the respondentswwere indeed able to make these distinctions and that their responses were systematic. As you can see in Table 2, there is a clear ordering of the bases of power with referent and expert power being most likely, followed by legitimate, reward and coercion (least likely).

Table 2 about here

Table 3 shows us the husband-wife differences. Husbands are most likely to say that they were influenced by their wives because they were part of the same family (referent power) and therefore should see eye-to-eye on these matters. Wives are particularly likely to attribute expert power to their husbands with referent power only slightly (and not significantly) lower. Thus the major sex differences are in the expert and referent categories. Note next the relationship between power base and age. Expert influence

Table 3 about here

is most often attributed to the spouse by younger respondents, with that basis decreasing with age. Referent power is relatively high even for the younger couples, but increases even further with age. Both of these trends are broken in the small group of "over 70" families.

Table 4 about here

In table 5 we see the effects of education. Again, we see a trend, with expertise increasing with amount of education, referent influence decreasing, though less markedly.

Table 5 about here

In Table 6 we see how power base varies with domain of power, the behavioral area within which influence is attempted. These data grow out of a series of questions about specific domains, e.g., "Suppose your husband/wife asked you to go visit some friend or relative and, even though you didn't feel like it, you did as he/she asked . . ." Note that in this case legitimate influence was predominant, as was also the case in "repairing or cleaning something around

the house." In "changing some personal habit" and going "to see a doctor" even though "you didn't feel that badly." Referent power was operative in getting a spouse to go somewhere for an outing or vacation and changing a station on TV or radio.

Table 6 about here

Recently, the same approach has been used by Frank Newton in an interview study of the husbands (casados) and common-law partners (juntos) in the Guatemalan peasant community of San Marcos la Laguna. Unfortunately, the domains of power sampled were not really comparable to those in our Los Angeles study. However, it is interesting that reward power was most frequently attributed in San Marcos in at least one comparable area--going to a fiesta (outing). In eleven of the domains sampled, expert power of the female partner was most frequently cited, legitimate was most frequent for four areas, referent for only one. It was expected that the power bases for common-law relationships would be different from those which had been legitimated and made virtually permanent in a church ceremony. This expectation does not seem to have been borne out.

Back to the Los Angeles study, the respondents were asked what aspects of marriage they found most valuable. We see the differences here in Table 7. The major indication here is that if the respondent rates "chance to have children," "love and affection" or "companionship" as the most valuable part of marriage, then referent influence is predominant. If to have a partner who "understands your problems" is most valuable, then expert power is most salient. Few respondents ranked "standard of living" as most valuable, such that differences in this category are not significant, but it is interesting to note

that reward and legitimacy were most frequent for these respondents. Table 8 shows the relationship between marital satisfaction and attributed basis of power. Note particularly the increased attribution of referent power in the "very satisfied" couples and the disproportionate attribution of "coercion" in the relatively few respondents who said that they were "not at all satisfied."

Table 7 and 8 about here

To conclude then, we have found differences in attributed bases of social power of spouses which seem meaningful and systematic. Let us then look briefly at another empirical study of power utilization.

Power in the Classroom

For a study of bases of social power in the classroom, we were fortunate in being able to include some social power items in a study of the Riverside school system. In this case, we presented junior high school students with a specific situation. ". . . very often students forget and leave their books, or their papers and things lying around . . . Suppose your teacher asked you to pick up your things that you had left around, and you did pick them up . . ." Again, the respondents were asked to respond in terms of the likelihood and most likely of the six power bases. The same situation was presented for a peer--"The student who sits on your right"--asking the respondent to pick up his books and papers. We can see in Table 9 the differences between power attributed to teacher and to fellow student. Note that the teacher comes out

Table 9 about here

highest in legitimate power. The fellow student comes out highest in referent

power, with informational power as a close second. We may also note the fact that the teacher comes out much higher in expert power and coercive power, the student higher in reward power referent and informational power. The differences, though striking, are, of course, not particularly surprising. Rather we look to these to again emphasize that the bases of social power typology can be presented so as to elicit meaningful and systematic responses. We are now examining our data for individual and group differences in power attributions.

Recently, David W. Jamieson has conducted a comparison of power base ascribed to teachers by high school, undergraduate, and graduate students. In this case, the questions were phrased in general terms, rather than specific to a given domain--"Why are you influenced by your teachers?" Though the instrument was a paired comparison questionnaire, using different items, Jamieson found significant differences between age groups. High school students ranked legitimate power as most likely (just as our junior high school students), his undergraduate respondents rated coercive power as most likely (e.g., "that person is able to harm me in some way") while graduate students ranked "expert" as highest with "informational" a close second.

Power Relationships between Parents and Children

Unfortunately, our social power analysis has not yet been utilized to any great extent to study the interaction between parents and children. One indication of the potential fruitfulness of such an analysis is provided by a study in the UCLA Psychological Clinic, as reported by Goldstein, Judd, et al. (1968). The study focused on 20 disturbed adolescents, ages 13-19, sixteen boys and four girls, who had been referred to the clinic. These adolescents were categorized according to the locus of their principal problems (outside or inside

the home) and the manner of the problem (active or passive). The parents were then asked to role play a conflict situation in which they attempted to influence their son or daughter. The role-playing was tape-recorded and coded according to manner of influence. There were some clear indications that the manner of influence was related to the form of the disturbance: the private dependent bases of power (legitimate, referent, and expert) were particularly likely to be used by parents of adolescents with problems outside the home. This was especially true with the use of legitimacy. Parents whose children had problems inside the home were more likely to use a subtle form of personal coercion, usually framed as a question--"Don't you realize how bad your plan is?" or "Do you want to turn out (bad) like your brother?" Expertise was associated with "active" forms of disturbance. Informational influence was more characteristic of "passive" or withdrawn patterns of behavior.

The authors are cautious regarding interpretations of their data. It is, of course, difficult to determine the direction of causality--does the pattern of maladjustment determine the power used by the parent, or does the parental power contribute to particular forms of disturbance? Yet, the directions suggested by the study are indeed interesting.

Some Recent Directions in Further Research and Analysis

In our recent thinking and research, we have been trying to extend social power theory in several directions:

Attributions and social power. One area which we have been considering is that relating to attribution of causality for change and social power. Some work already carried out by attribution theorists has suggested some directions in this regard. It seems particularly clear that when coercion and reward are utilized, the agent, O, is seen as the locus for the changed pattern of behavior by P. When informational influence is used, the locus is more likely ascribed

to P--O provided the information, but P chose to utilize that information. We can speculate that the other, private dependent forms of power, are in-between, with locus of control more ambiguously assigned to O or P.

Power preference. A second area of research relates to power preference, choice of power base. When French and I formulated our original statement this question of basis for choice of power by O seemed pretty obvious.

On the assumption that man is rational, we should expect one to use the basis of power which will most likely lead to successful influence. He should prefer to use the influence which would not require surveillance and which would be longlasting. Obviously, informational power looks best, providing one has the resources to convince the influencee logically and with information available. If not, then maybe we should prefer a private dependent basis, selecting which is most likely to lead to results. Coercion should be a last resort, since it requires extensive surveillance, and gets the influencee mad at us. Our initial naive analysis of a rational influencing agent would have led us in this direction of analysis. But what about the amount of effort and expenditure of valuable resources. Rosenberg and Pearlin (1962) who conducted one of the few explicit studies of power preference found that nurses in a psychiatric ward wishing to influence a patient seemed to follow a process of selection such as the above. However, effort did play an important part. The means considered most likely to be effective was often rejected on grounds that it would involve too much effort.

In our later considerations, power preference began to assume an even greater degree of complexity (Raven & Kruglanski, 1970). Consider such other factors as the following:

(a) Desire for continued dependence. The use of informational influence may lead P to become rapidly independent of O. This may not always be desirable for O. Thus he may prefer to use expertise, even when information is possible (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).

(b) Distrust of other. When O does not trust P, then O will be more likely to use a form of power which will be certain to lead to compliance-- such as coercion. Coercion, in turn, requires surveillance; and surveillance tends to maintain or increase an attitude of distrust. (Strickland, 1958; Kruglanski, 1970).

(c) Attraction, hostility, and displacement of aggression. There is increasing evidence that we will use coercion against those we dislike, even when other power options are possible (Michener & Schwertzerger, 1972; Michener & Suchner, 1972; Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970).

(d) Self-confidence, self-esteem, and need for power. When O is insecure, uncertain of himself, when O feels a need to establish his power, he may use a form of power which will lead to attributing locus of control to himself. Thus he might again choose coercion even when information or legitimacy may be possible or even simpler to use (Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970; Kipnis & Lane, 1972). Paula Johnson will have some additional data in this regard in the paper which follows.

(e) Role expectations and pressures. Some forms of influence may simply not be seen as appropriate for a given role, even when they could be effective. In a culture when the female is not supposed to be too clever, there may be tremendous pressures on a woman to avoid the use of expert influence, or even informational influence, and fall back on other forms, such as the legitimate power of dependence.

These then are some of the considerations which will be considered in the papers which follow.

Table 1

THE BASES OF SOCIAL POWER

BASES OF SOCIAL POWER	Further Differentiation	Relationship between influencing Agent (O) and Influencee (P) in Social Influence Process: Initial Dependence on Influencing Agent	Importance of Surveillance by Agent
COERCION (Threat of punishment)	a. Personal Coercion b. Impersonal Coercion	Dependent on O	Surveillance Important
REWARD (Promise of reward)	a. Personal Reward b. Impersonal Reward	Dependent on O	Surveillance Important
REFERENCE (Identification with O)	a. Perception of similarity b. Desired similarity	Dependent on O	Surveillance Unimportant
LEGITIMACY (Acceptance of social structure relationship, obligation)	a. Formal authority structure b. Informal social obligation (helplessness, return of favor	Dependent on O	Surveillance Unimportant
EXPERTISE (Superior knowledge of O)	a. Formal expertise b. Casual expertise	Dependent on O	Surveillance Unimportant
INFORMATIONAL (Content of communication)	a. Direct logical persuasion b. Casual dropping of information	Independent of O	Surveillance

TABLE 2

Likelihood that Respondent Would Be Influenced by Various Power Bases as Exercised by Spouse

Basis of Power	N	Percentage Indicating Influence[1]		
		Very Unlikely	Somewhat Likely	Very Likely
Reward	762	45%	35%	20%
Coercion	757	55	35	10
Expert	765	15	31	54
Legitimate	765	14	39	47
Referent	767	10	35	55

[1] Differences in percentages greater than 5% are significant at the .05 level of confidence.

TABLE 3

Percentages of Husbands and Wives Attributing Each Basis of Power to Respective Spouses

Sex of Respondent	Predominant Basis of Power Attributed to Spouse: Reward	Coercion	Expert	Legitimate	Referent
Male (331)[1]	6%	3%	21%	22%	48%
Female (342)	4	4	37	18	36
Total[2] (746)	4	3	26	19	48

[1]Ns. In comparing percentages for males and females, a difference greater than 7.5% is significant at the .05 level.

[2]Discrepancy in N due to failure of some interviewers to indicate sex of respondent.

TABLE 4

Age Differences in Percentages Attributing Each Basis of Power to Respective Spouses

		Predominant Basis of Power			
Age of Respondent	Reward	Coercion	Expert	Legitimate	Referent
Under 30 (113)[1]	4%	22	33%	21%	40%
30 - 39 (239)	6	3	28	22	43
40 - 49 (166)	7	5	25	13	50
50 - 59 (129)	2	2	27	16	54
60 - 69 (56)	4	0	14	21	61
Over 70 (39)	0	4	22	23	46

[1]No.

TABLE 5

Education Differences in Percentages Attributing Each Basis of Power to Respective Spouses

Educational Level of Respondent	Predominant Basis of Power Attributed to Spouse				
	Reward	Coercion	Expert	Legitimate	Referent
Complete College (117)[1]	28	28	30%	18%	48%
Some College (152)	2	2	34	18	43
Complete High School (233)	3	2	29	19	48
Some High School (184)	4	2	22	26	46
Complete Grammar School (51)	6	4	22	14	53
Some Grammar School (42)	17	10	11	8	34
No Schooling (4)	0	0	25	50	25
N. I. (7)	0	0	15	0	85

[1] No.

TABLE 6

Percentage Attributing Each Basis of Power to Spouse as a Function of Domain of Power

Domain of Power	N	Predominant Basis of Power Attributed to Spouse: Reward	Coercion	Expert	Legitimate	Referent
"Visit some friend or relative"	768	7%	8%	15%	43%	27%
"Change some personal habit"	758	6	9	35	30	20
"Repair or clean something around house"	766	5	13	28	35	19
"Change station on TV or radio"	766	14	13	8	30	35
"Go somewhere for outing or vacation"	760	10	3	10	37	40
"Go see a doctor"	768	1	2	55	22	20

Note: In comparing percentages between domains, any difference in percentage greater than 5% is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

TABLE 7

Percentage Attributing Each Basis of Power to Spouse as Function of Respondent's Values in Marriage

Most Valued Part of Marriage	N	Predominant Basis of Power Attributed to Spouse				
		Reward	Coercion	Expert	Legitimate	Referent
"Chance to have children"	112	9%	3%	25%	17%	46%
"Understanding of your problems"	133	6	2	39	20	35
"Love and affection"	177	2	3	32	18	45
"Companionship"	327	3	2	22	18	55
"Standard of living"	12	25	8	8	42	17

Note: In comparing percentages between groups according to values in marriage, differences in percentages greater than the following are significant at the .05 level: "children" vs. "understanding" - 12.6%, "children" vs. "affection" - 11.8%, "children" vs. "companionship" - 10.8%, "understanding" vs. "affection" - 11.3%; "understanding" vs. "companionship" - 10.4%; "affection" vs. "companionship" - 9.2%.

TABLE 8

Percentage Attributing Each Basis of Power to Spouse as Related to Satisfaction in Marriage

Degree of Satisfaction with Marriage	Predominant Basis of Power Attributed to Spouse					
	N	Reward	Coercion	Expert	Legitimate	Referent
Very Satisfied	537	3%	2%	27%	20%	49%
Fairly Satisfied	172	8	3	27	19	42
Not at all Satisfied	19	0	42	26	10	21
No Response	28	0	4	22	14	60

TABLE 9

Frequencies of Junior High School Students Attributing Differing Bases of Power to Teacher and to Fellow Student

Basis of Power	Number attributing power to	
	Teacher	Fellow Student
Coercion	45	2
Reward	12	47
Expert	85	47
Legitimacy	198	26
Referent	15	190
Information	99	134

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